US President Donald Trump has signed sweeping legislation expanding American sanctions and tariff powers against Russia, converting a months-long congressional initiative into law.
The White House confirmed that Trump signed H.R. 5334 on Friday, September 18.
The legislation is formally titled the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. It was renamed in honour of the late Republican senator from South Carolina, a prominent supporter of Ukraine and one of the measure’s principal advocates before his death in July.
The White House said the law authorises and expands statutory sanctions, tariffs and prohibitions on Russia while extending existing sanctions against Iran.
Its purpose is to restrict revenue and financial resources available to Moscow as Russia continues its war against Ukraine.
The provisions target Russia’s energy and defence industries, financial institutions, major state-backed energy projects and the network of tankers commonly described as its “shadow fleet.”
Those vessels transport Russian oil while attempting to avoid sanctions, insurance restrictions, price caps and other controls imposed by the United States and its partners.
The legislation’s reach is not confined to Russian entities.
It also gives the US president authority to impose secondary tariffs against major purchasers of Russian crude oil and natural gas.
An earlier version proposed blanket tariffs as high as 500%. The version advanced by the Senate reduced the maximum to 100% and focused the mechanism on the largest purchasers.
That authority could expose countries with major Russian-energy relationships to additional US import duties.
China and India are among the most important purchasers of Russian crude, while several European and Asian economies remain significant buyers of Russian gas.
The final law contains conditions and exceptions, including consideration for countries importing comparatively small shares of Russian gas and taking meaningful steps to reduce those purchases.
The international consequences will therefore depend on how the administration identifies covered countries, calculates their exposure, uses available waivers and sets implementation dates.
The signing should not be reported as proof that 100% tariffs have already taken effect against China, India or any other named country.
The verified development is that Trump now possesses the statutory authority to deploy the measures.
Separate presidential, Treasury, Commerce or customs actions may be required to designate targets, issue regulations and begin collecting particular tariffs.
That distinction matters for businesses and financial markets.
A law authorising sanctions establishes the legal framework. Actual commercial effects depend on subsequent implementation, exemptions, enforcement guidance and the response of affected governments.
The measure passed the Senate in August and the House of Representatives on Wednesday, September 16.
During House consideration, lawmakers attempted to amend the legislation’s secondary-tariff provisions.
A proposal to remove the broad tariff authority was defeated in the Rules Committee. Another unsuccessful amendment would have specified an initial list of countries potentially eligible for duties of up to 100%.
Because those amendments were not adopted, proposed country lists should not be presented as a final automatic schedule of tariffs.
The law gives Trump considerable discretion.
It permits the administration to waive or adjust certain sanctions and tariffs when it considers doing so to be in the US national interest.
Critics argue that such discretion could allow economic measures to be applied inconsistently or used as leverage in disputes not directly connected to Ukraine.
They also warn that long-duration tariffs could outlast Trump’s presidency, leaving future administrations and trading partners to manage consequences arising from decisions made under the new authority.
Supporters say flexibility is necessary for diplomacy.
They argue that an inflexible sanctions regime could punish countries attempting to reduce Russian imports, disrupt allied energy supplies or prevent the president from offering relief in exchange for verifiable concessions by Moscow.
The legislation increases pressure on Russia at a particularly unstable moment.
Russia and Ukraine continue attacking energy-related infrastructure despite Trump’s announcement that the two countries had agreed to halt such operations.
Neither Moscow nor Kyiv has jointly published a completed ceasefire agreement defining protected targets, commencement times or monitoring arrangements.
The sanctions law consequently becomes an additional instrument through which Washington can pressure Russia without directly deploying military force.
Its effect on Moscow will depend partly on enforcement outside the United States.
Russia has adapted to previous restrictions by redirecting oil exports, using intermediary companies, changing vessel ownership and registration, and increasing trade through countries that did not adopt Western sanctions.
The shadow-fleet provisions seek to close some of those routes by targeting vessels and the companies, financiers and service providers supporting them.
Effective enforcement will require identification of ownership networks, monitoring of ship-to-ship transfers, cooperation with maritime registries and action against institutions processing related payments.
The secondary-tariff authority is designed to influence countries that might otherwise have little incentive to comply with American sanctions.
It effectively presents major energy buyers with a choice between maintaining unrestricted access to the US market and continuing specified Russian-energy purchases.
That approach could reduce Moscow’s income if buyers cut their imports.
It could also create trade disputes, encourage retaliatory tariffs and alter oil and gas flows without eliminating global demand.
Energy-market effects remain uncertain.
If Russian supplies are removed faster than alternative production becomes available, prices could rise. If buyers continue purchasing Russian energy at larger discounts or through new intermediaries, Moscow may preserve export volumes while earning less revenue per unit.
The law’s Iran provisions add another dimension.
The White House said H.R. 5334 extends existing sanctions against Iran, although its signing announcement did not provide a complete operational breakdown of every extended measure.
Russia and Iran cooperate in defence, energy and sanctions-evasion networks, but provisions applying to each country must be evaluated separately as implementation guidance emerges.
No comprehensive assessment of the law’s economic impact had been published by the administration when this report was prepared.
Russia had also not announced its complete response to the signing.
The next decisive developments will be Treasury designations, implementing regulations, tariff proclamations, waivers and reactions from major purchasers of Russian energy.
Until those actions occur, the law should be described as a major expansion of US sanctions and tariff authority—not as confirmation that every possible sanction or maximum tariff is already operational.
