The United States Federal Aviation Administration has delayed certification of Boeing’s 737 MAX 10 after a newly disclosed software problem raised questions about automated flight guidance during a particular landing scenario.
FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford said the agency would not approve the aircraft until it was satisfied that the problem had been addressed.
“We will be delaying the 10 until we’re satisfied that we don’t have an issue here,” Bedford told reporters at Reagan Washington National Airport on Monday, September 28.
He did not estimate whether the delay would last days, weeks or months.
The announcement is a significant setback because Boeing had completed the MAX 10’s planned certification flights and recently described regulatory approval as “very soon.”
Boeing shares fell 6.3% following the disclosure, reflecting concern about further disruption to the largest version of the company’s best-selling aircraft family.
The software problem occurs during a specific sequence after a missed approach—also known as a go-around—when pilots alter the aircraft’s preprogrammed flight path.
Under those circumstances, pilots may lose access to automated flight guidance and must follow additional procedures.
Boeing said it informed 737 operators about the issue in August, reinforced existing procedures for managing the condition and began developing a permanent software update.
The FAA initially said it would convene a Corrective Action Review Board and take immediate action if it identified a safety concern. Monday’s announcement establishes that MAX 10 certification will now wait for an acceptable resolution.
The problem should not be described as removing control of the aircraft.
Bedford said pilots retained control when the problem occurred, distinguishing it from the automatic flight-control behaviour associated with the two fatal MAX 8 crashes in 2018 and 2019.
There have been no reported crashes or injuries attributed to the newly disclosed condition.
The current problem also should not be labelled an MCAS failure. The available information identifies it as an automated flight-guidance or flight-management software problem affecting a particular missed-approach sequence.
Bedford said the software was supplied by GE Aerospace, a major Boeing supplier, and suggested that the intense regulatory attention could accelerate development of a correction.
“Is that weeks, days, months? I don’t know,” he said.
GE Aerospace had not publicly responded to Reuters’ request for comment when the report was published. Boeing said it would continue following the FAA’s direction during certification.
The operational impact differs among airlines.
WestJet said it uses the software being reviewed but had experienced no related in-service events. The Canadian carrier said its standard operating procedures and pilot training mitigate the condition and that it did not regard the matter as a safety concern.
Alaska Airlines and United Airlines said their existing fleets do not use the affected software.
United said it would not accept aircraft equipped with the version under review. Alaska, which has ordered the MAX 10, said it was working with Boeing and the FAA while they assessed the problem.
The exact number of aircraft worldwide operating with the relevant software has not been publicly confirmed.
The certification delay arrived when the MAX 10 appeared close to completing a lengthy approval process.
Boeing said in July that the aircraft had finished 976 planned certification flights, accumulating more than 2,060 flight hours and approximately 1,040 hours of ground testing.
The testing covered landing gear, braking on wet runways, maximum-energy rejected takeoffs, an updated engine anti-ice system and an enhanced angle-of-attack system.
Following the final planned flight, Boeing’s work shifted towards completing development-assurance reviews, system-safety assessments and final submissions for FAA examination.
On September 16, Boeing chief executive Kelly Ortberg told investors that all flight testing was complete and predicted certification “very soon.”
The FAA’s intervention means that forecast can no longer be relied upon.
Neither the regulator nor Boeing has issued a revised approval or first-delivery date. Boeing previously expected MAX 10 deliveries to begin in 2027.
The MAX 10 is strategically important to Boeing.
It is the longest and highest-capacity member of the MAX family and competes with Airbus’s A321neo at the upper end of the single-aisle market. Delayed certification postpones Boeing’s ability to deliver completed aircraft, recognise revenue and give airline customers the capacity they planned around the model.
The commercial effect will depend on the duration of the delay and whether the FAA requires new testing, documentation, pilot procedures or modifications beyond a corrected software release.
Bedford’s suggestion that the problem may be corrected quickly offers some reassurance, but it is not a formal schedule or guarantee.
The market reaction illustrates the consequences of uncertainty. A 6.3% fall in Boeing’s share price does not prove that the aircraft will face a prolonged delay; it shows that investors immediately repriced the risk.
The development also adds to the history of scrutiny surrounding the MAX programme.
Two MAX 8 crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia killed 346 people and led to a worldwide grounding. Regulators subsequently required software, training and oversight changes before the aircraft returned to service.
The present software problem is different and has not been linked to an accident. However, that history means regulators, airlines, investors and passengers are likely to examine any new MAX software issue closely.
Boeing itself has presented the MAX 10 as introducing enhanced avionics intended to identify faulty angle-of-attack data, simplify pilot warnings and reduce workload. Those improvements concern a different system, but they illustrate how central software validation has become to the model’s certification.
The strongest verified conclusion is that the FAA has postponed MAX 10 certification until the flight-guidance software issue is satisfactorily resolved.
It is not yet established how long the delay will last, whether regulators outside the United States will impose additional requirements, how many aircraft contain the affected software or when customer deliveries can begin.
There is also no evidence in the available reporting that the entire in-service MAX fleet is being grounded.
Coverage should therefore avoid portraying the announcement as either an immediate fleet-wide emergency or a minor administrative pause.
It is a concrete certification delay triggered by a software problem that can increase pilot workload during a specific phase of flight. Its ultimate safety, operational and financial consequences remain under regulatory review.
